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ABSTRACT 
The pre-war approaches to trade unions were mainly based on the theoretical and 
methodological viewpoints of early institutional economics. Trade unions were 
conceived of as politico-economic organizations whose members were motivated by 
relative comparisons and also were concerned with issues of equity and justice. In the 
post-war period, there was a major theoretical and methodological shift towards the 
idea of unions as optimizing economic units with well-defined objective functions 
which are optimized subject to purely economic constraints. This conceptual 
transformation took place mainly through the Dunlop-Ross debate, in which  John 
Dunlop conceived unions as analogous to business firms, which was contrary to 
Arthur Ross’ institutional and political approach. The emerging post war mainstream 
methodological framework with its mathematical formalism and the exclusion of 
sociological, political and psychological elements from economic analysis was the 
main reason for the prevalence of Dunlop’s ideas. However, after decades of 
analytical developments, the current state of trade union theory has not produced very 
impressive theoretical results.The paper traces the historical development of the 
economic analysis of the trade unions from a methodological perspective. It  
examines  the methodological reasons for the dominance of Dunlop’s approach and 
also  the current state of, and the contemporary criticism towards, the established 
theory. Furthermore, it discusses the contemporary efforts to build a more 
comprehensive approach to trade union theory and to trade union objectives, also 
incorporating Ross’ institutional and political insights. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The economic analysis of trade unions has a long presence in the history of 
economic thought. Ideas concerning the nature, role, and function of trade unions, can 
be found in the 19th century economic literature. However, the marginalist and early 
neoclassical economists did not devote much attention to the economic analysis of 
trade unions. The basic reasons for this, was their conception that the study of 
institutions like unions, were outside the standard domain of economic analysis 
(Jevons 1882), and  that their institutional presence hampers the application of 
formalism to economics (Edgeworth 1881). On the contrary, contemporary  non-
mainstream theorists such as the Webbs and  early Insitutionalists,  had paid  
considerable attention to the study of trade unions, conceiving them as politico-
economic organizations and emphasizing their wider role as  social institutions 
(McNulty 1980). The gradual dominance of the orthodox approach after the WWII,  
also affected the study of trade unions. In particular, the establishment of orthodox 
microeconomic analysis combined with mathematical economic methodology, led   
mainstream theorists to incorporate trade unions in this conceptual framework. 
Mainstream theorists started to view trade unions as purely economic units analogous 
to firms,  which can be studied by applying the  standard  tools of microeconomic 
analysis (Kaufman 2002).  
John Dunlop’s work  was the main representation of the orthodox approach, 
while Arthur Ross’s ideas were much closer to the institutional-political approach to 
trade unionism. Thus, the well-known  Ross-Dunlop debate reflects the two streams 
of economic thought towards the nature and role of trade unions. The post war history 
of trade union literature  demonstrates that Dunlop’s ideas eventually prevailed.  The 
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emerging post war mainstream methodological framework with its mathematical 
formalism and the exclusion of sociological, political and psychological elements 
from economic analysis, was the main reason for the prevalence of Dunlop’s ideas. 
This meant that  the post-war mainstream approach conceived trade unions as 
economic decision units which maximize a union utility function subject to various 
objective constraints. Thus, the behaviour of the trade union could be described by 
applying the normal mathematical apparatus that was used in standard 
microeconomics (Boyer and Smith 2001). 
However, after decades of analytical developments, many labour economists 
have started to express serious concerns about the current state of trade union theory, 
mainly in terms of  its theoretical and predictive results.  Given this state of affairs, 
there are  increasing signs of reconsideration of the pre-war emphasis on other aspects 
of trade unions. This is manifested by a  re-evaluation  and a re-appreciation of Ross’ 
line of thought in the relevant literature (e.g. Manning 1994; Fleetwood 1999; 
Kaufman 2002).  
The paper examines the development of trade union theory and the 
methodological reasons for the dominance of Dunlop’s approach. It also examines the 
current state of, and the contemporary criticism towards, the established theory. 
Furthermore, it discusses the contemporary efforts to build a more comprehensive 
approach to trade union theory and to trade union objectives, also incorporating Ross’ 
institutional and political insights. The paper will start with  a brief discussion of the 
pre-war period concerning union function and objectives. The following section will 
concentrate on the post war methodological shift which greatly affected the theory of 
unions. Sections  IV and V will discuss the Ross-Dunlop debate and the dominance of 
Dunlop’s line of thought. Section VI will present the criticisms of the established 
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approach and also the main signs of  the re evaluation of Ross’ ideas. Finally, a 
concluding section will close the paper.  
       
II. Union Objectives: The Pre-War Period 
Trade unions are almost as old as industrial revolution and the ensuing 
industrialization process. However, the early economic literature on unions and their 
objectives was rather short and incomplete. “The alleged antipathy of the classical 
economists to the idea of unions is the implied reason for the (…) neglect of unions 
(…) Economists of the period [were also] conservative with respect to social change, 
[considering] unions dangerous and unworkable” (McNulty 1980: 82; brackets 
added). But it seems that classical economists’ attitude towards unionism was also 
influenced by their views on “the nature of economics as an inquiry” (Ibid.: 83). In 
particular, classical economic thought advocated free labor markets and considered 
the relationship between capital and labor to be non-competitive. Thus, classical 
economists, by stressing the monopolistic nature of trade unions, had serious doubts 
regarding  their  beneficial role  in economic life. 
Marginalists and early neoclassical analysts claimed that the existence of 
institutions, like unions, renders the labor market problem mathematically 
indeterminate (Edgeworth 1881, Jevons 1882). Accordingly, practical issues 
regarding labour have nothing to do with economic science (Jevons 1882: 154-55). 
However, the gradual increase of the magnitude and power of unions in western 
economies induced some non-mainstream economists to carefully examine the nature 
of unions (Ely 1890). In the 1880’s and 1890’s there were numerous studies  which 
analyzed in detail individual unions, or issues related to unions’ management and 
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organization or the subject of strikes and the potential benefits of workers from their 
participation in unions (see the first volumes of QJE, JPE, AER, PSQ). 
The first thorough and systematic study of an economic analysis of trade 
unions seems to be Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s work Industrial Democracy (1897). 
Webbs described their methodological approach as follows:  
“We then analyze the economic characteristics, not of combination in the 
abstract in a world of ideal competition, but of the actual Trade Unionism of the 
present day in the business world as we know it” (1897: viii).  
 
Their analysis was divided into three parts: first, they investigated the structure of 
trade unions, emphasizing the political aspect of “unions as democracies”. Second, 
they attempted to analyze, through empirical facts and with the aid of statistics, how 
trade unions work, a methodological approach which was favourite to Webbs. Third, 
by seeking to develop their own theory, they strongly criticized the free competition 
hypothesis adopted by classical and early neoclassical writers, characterizing its 
nature as utopian. Webbs were in favour of the “method of collective bargaining”, 
which in combination with the “method of legal enactment”, could strengthen the 
position of labourers in the labour market. Therefore, they held that the main union 
objective is the increase of labourers’ bargaining power against employers. 
 In a similar vein, early institutional economists, such as John Commons, were 
proponents of collective action through unionism. Besides the economic purpose of 
unions, viz. the improvement of working conditions and labourers’ living standard or 
the redistribution of wealth, Commons also attached great significance to “the more 
general function of unionism – responsibility for representative democracy in 
industry” (M. Perlman 1960: 341; see also Kaufman 2000). Furthermore, the first 
generation of institutional economists – Robert Hoxie, Selig Perlman and George 
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Barnett – did not try to formalize their ideas on trade unions, but instead, they adopt a 
more sociological-historical approach, which clearly demonstrates the 
interdisciplinary character of their studies. In general, they conceived  unions as  
politico-economic organizations whose members were motivated by relative 
comparisons and also were concerned with issues of equity and justice (Drakopoulos 
2011: 8). They also sought to place unions into different categories according to their 
structure and  their specific purpose or their social function. Furthermore, they  
describe in details the various duties and responsibilities of unions, and explain the 
factors which influenced the development of unionism.  
Apart from the above, some mainstream theorists made their first attempts to 
model union economic behaviour. John Hicks in The Theory of Wages (1932) 
developed a model of bargaining between the trade union and employer, which 
constituted the basis for future theoretical approaches like the “efficient bargaining” 
model or the “right-to-manage” model. During the same period, Frederik Zeuthen in 
his Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare (1930) also formed a model of 
bargaining under bilateral monopoly. Hicks, in his theoretical model of industrial 
disputes, showed that a union can compel an employer to pay wages higher than the 
competitive level, because the employer faces the credible threat of a strike and tries 
to avoid the ensuing losses from a stoppage. 
 Zeuthen and Hicks’ works seem to be the first and preliminary attempts 
towards constructing a theoretical model with respect to unions’ activity and 
objectives, and may also be regarded as precursors of the developments occurred 
during the next decades in trade union analysis. In particular, after the World War II, 
there was a gradual shift from an institutional and holistic approach towards a more 
 7 
neoclassical and formalized approach by constructing formal analytical models of 
unions within a specific microeconomic framework (Drakopoulos 2011).  
 
III. The Post-War Methodological Shift  
The post war theoretical and methodological developments in economics are 
essential for the understanding of the formation of the current neoclassical economic 
theory of the trade union. The orthodox approach towards the economic analysis of 
the trade unions was heavily influenced by the established mainstream economic 
methodology. This clearly implies that in order to understand the development of the 
trade union analysis, a brief methodological based discussion is necessary.  
Mainstream economic methodology during the period of interest was 
characterized by two basic features: a) the increasing dominance of mathematical 
formalism and b) the strive to exclude sociological, political and psychological 
elements from economic analysis. This methodological approach had its conceptual 
roots in the late 19th century marginalism. The development and the gradual 
establishment of marginal utility theory was associated with the adoption of 
mathematics as a basic instrument of economic analysis. The methodological 
propositions of the majority of economists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th centuries were driven by the idea that the scientific character of economics 
could be accomplished through the adoption of the mathematical approach. For 
example, Jevons, Edgeworth, Walras, Pareto, J. N. Keynes (and Marshall in regard to 
the use of geometry), Wicksell, Cassel, Fisher, etc. recognized and emphasized the 
advantages of mathematical formalism in economics (Dow 2002). Thus, the 
methodological conceptual framework, in which the post war theoretical discussions 
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of trade unions were formed, was clearly changing in favour of abstract theorizing and 
the incorporation of the mathematical analysis in economics. 
  The exclusion of sociological and psychological aspects from economics had 
also its origins in the same period. In particular, towards the end of the 19th century, 
the first clear signs of the tendency to expel philosophical, psychological and 
sociological issues from economic theory, were observed. The increasing dominance 
of positivism and physicalism, with their emphasis on the rejection of all allegedly 
non-scientific elements from scientific theory, was the main cause of this tendency 
(Seligman 1969; Wisman 1978). The trend was reinforced by the growing prestige of 
physics among scientific disciplines. Many economic theorists saw the method of 
classical physics as the ideal model for a scientific discipline (for discussions of the 
influence of physics on economics see Mirowski 1989 and Drakopoulos 1994). The 
influence of L. Robbins was critical in this respect. More specifically, Robbins was 
strongly opposed to the idea that economics should adopt findings from other social 
sciences. His view concerning the role of psychology is indicative of this attitude: ‘I 
doubt whether anything which has yet been written by psychologists has the slightest 
value for the economist’ (quoted by Howson 2004: 430; see also Robbins 1932: 83-
84). Even before Robbins, V. Pareto had also argued against incorporating 
psychology or findings from other social fields to economics. However, there are 
grounds for attributing the subsequent negative attitudes towards employing findings 
from related social fields of many contemporary mainstream economics, to Robbins’s 
methodological stance on this issue (Bruni & Sugden 2007). This tendency to separate 
economics from other social sciences, including psychology, has been linked to the 
idea of economics as the most advanced of the social sciences, and hence the one that 
is closest to the physical sciences (see Dow 2002: 170-75).  
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In the post war period, logical positivism, the modern version of 19th century 
positivism, became the dominant methodological stance among the vast majority of 
mainstream economists. In particular, they were content to follow the so-called 
hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation, which emerged in the first 
decades of the 20th century mainly from the work of the Vienna circle (Blaug 1980: 
1-4; Caldwell 1982: 11-18; Redman 1993). To a large extent, these ideas were 
brought in economics by T. Hutchison (1938) and eventually they became the 
established view. A clear indication of the powerful influence of logical positivism in 
economics was the great popularity of the term “positive” among economists which 
became widely known mainly from M. Friedman’s (1953) work on economic method. 
Although Friedman’s argument was rooted in economics rather than philosophy, it 
summarized the “mature positivist” approach (Backhouse 1994: 182 and Caldwell 
1982: 173). The irrelevance of the assumptions thesis expressed in M. Friedman’s 
(1953) well-known paper was basically a methodological justification for isolating 
economic research from other social sciences. The central idea here is that the realism 
of behavioural assumptions in economics does not matter as long as aggregate data 
behaves as if these assumptions were accurate (Friedman 1953). This widely accepted 
methodological position provided a “valid” reason for the exclusion of psychological 
and sociological elements and also support for the pure ‘economic’ approach to 
human behaviour, which is seen as extremely successful and superior compared to 
other social sciences. It also served as an additional shield from criticism by non-
orthodox theorists.  
Given the above, the post-war mainstream approach conceived trade unions as 
economic decision units which are characterized by a well-defined union utility 
function. This function is optimized subject to various objective constraints associated 
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with the firm in which they operate. Thus, the behaviour of the trade union could be 
described by applying the normal mathematical tools that were used in standard 
microeconomics. Furthermore, the sociological and political dimensions of trade 
unions were deemed to be irrelevant for union model-building given the prevailing 
methodological framework of excluding “non-positive” elements.  
       
IV. The Ross-Dunlop Debate 
During the 1940s, a debate arose among labor economists over the incentives 
underlying the behaviour of unions. “At the roots of this controversy was the fact that 
while microeconomic theory provided a model for the behavior of the firm based on 
profit maximization – essentially the same model appears in textbooks today – labor 
economists had no such widely accepted theory of labor union activity” (Mitchell 
1972: 46). The leading figures of this debate were Arthur Ross and John Dunlop. The 
former was closer to institutional-political approach, while the latter adopted a more 
neoclassical point of view.  
In particular, Dunlop in his book Wage Determination under Trade Unions 
(1944), by conceiving unions as analogous to business firms, developed a formal 
analytical model of trade union behaviour relied upon the microeconomic theory of 
the firm. Dunlop held that union is a “decision-making unit” which tries to maximize 
some objective, considering “wage bill for the total membership” to be the most 
appropriate union’s goal, subject to various constraints such as the firm’s labour 
demand curve (Dunlop 1944: 4, 44; Kaufman 2002). In the words of Dunlop:  
“An economic theory of a trade union requires that the organization be assumed 
to maximize (or minimize) something. Although not the only possible objective, 
maximization of the wage bill may be regarded as the standard case” (1944: 4-
5).  
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However, Dunlop, besides wage-bill maximization, also referred to other union 
objectives such as the guarantee of the largest possible union employment or the 
maximization of the “collective wage ‘rents’ of those employed” (Ibid.: 41; italics in 
original). Moreover, he maintained that wages and employment level are also 
influenced by the different positions of the membership function (Kaufman 2002). 
On the other hand, Ross, through his works The Trade Union as a Wage-
Fixing Institution (1947) and Trade Union Wage Policy (1948), strongly criticized 
Dunlop’s “economic” union model, placing emphasis on the nature of the union as a 
political agency. In his own words:  
“The trade union is a political institution which participates in the establishment 
of wage rates. To conceive of the union as a seller of labor attempting to 
maximize some measurable object (such as the wage bill) is a highly misleading 
formulation. Although comparable with a business firm in some respects, it is so 
dissimilar in other respects that the analogy is of questionable value” (1947: 
587).  
 
Ross turned against Dunlop’s thesis of a well-defined microeconomic-based union 
objective function. First, he asserted that unions try to maximize a non-measurable 
variable, viz. the economic welfare (wages, hours and conditions of work, etc.) of 
their members, in contrast to firms’ goal of maximizing their stockholders’ profits. In 
addition, trade unions’ feature of the heterogeneity of their members, implies that 
individual union members often have conflicting preferences and interests due to 
differences in age, seniority, wages and other related factors. These features render  
the aggregation of the individual preferences of union members an extremely difficult 
task. Significant differences also exist between the union leaders and the rank and file, 
as long as the former often behave according to their personal ambitions, having also 
as a main purpose the survival and growth of the organization. Hence, the trade union 
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wage policy is not actually formed through the rank and file decisions, but it is a 
leadership function (Ross 1947: 582, 584). Finally, another important factor of 
unions’ behaviour is the distribution of authority between the local and national (or 
international) level (Ibid.: 578). The locus of the decision-making power can range 
from very centralized to highly decentralized level, placing different political 
pressures on various union leaders and affecting the union objectives in the collective 
bargaining processes. “Since the constellation of political pressures felt by the union 
leadership will vary greatly depending on the locus of bargaining, so will the 
objectives pursued by the leadership in collective negotiations (…) Thus, rather than 
treat the trade union as akin to a business enterprise, the union is instead modelled as 
a body of government, such as the U.S. Congress, and wage policy is treated as the 
outcome of a political process much as foreign policy of a nation is so considered” 
(Kaufman 2002: 117). 
Despite the fact that Dunlop and Ross models emphasized different aspects of 
union behaviour, we should also note that there are two converging points of view. 
First, both writers advocated an “interdisciplinary ‘industrial relations’ approach to 
studying unions” (Ibid.: 118). Even Dunlop, who was engaged in theory-building and 
strongly criticizes institutional and historical methodological approaches, rebutted 
neoclassical contention that economic theory can explain all aspects of human 
behaviour related to markets. Second, it is misleading to assert that Dunlop rejected 
the hypothesis of a union as a political institution or that Ross totally neglected the 
influence of economic factors on unions’ activity (Borland 1986). 
In the following decades, however, the differences between Dunlop and 
Ross’s viewpoints became more and more profound, thus establishing the dichotomy 
between analytical labor economics and institutional labor economics as these two 
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approaches are often called (see also Rees 1976). The widespread methodological 
framework of positive economic theorizing can be seen as the main cause of the 
dominance of Dunlop’s basic theoretical apparatus: just as firms are maximizing 
profits, unions maximize an objective utility function (see also Mitchell 1972). In 
contrast, Ross’ more institutional and political approach was clearly losing ground, 
given that it did not fit the above mentioned methodological requirements (see also 
Kaufman 2002). 
 
V. The Dominance of Dunlop’s Framework  
Dunlop’s pioneering work marked the commencement of a considerable 
literature that keeps accelerating up to the present time. Dunlop’s maximizing wage 
bill framework was also adopted by some other writers such as Hieser (1970) and 
Johnston (1972) who formulated a labour market model of wage determination under 
bilateral monopoly. Rent maximization is another union objective which is quite close 
to  wage bill trade union objective (see Rosen 1969; de Menil 1971 and Calvo 1978). 
In particular, de Menil (1997) assumes that the union cares about the ‘real wage 
surplus’, that is, the difference between the real wage bill in the union sector and that 
in the perfectly competitive sector” (Booth 1995: 90). However, both the wage bill 
and the rent maximization objective lost their attractiveness in the course of time. 
Thus, in more recent literature, viz. during the 1980s and 1990s, the union is assumed 
to maximize some utility function which is often the sum of the utilities of its 
individual members. Specifically, the union maximizes either a utilitarian utility 
function (see Oswald 1982) or an expected utility objective function (Booth 1995). 
Alternatively, the union maximizes a “general quasi-concave union utility function, 
usually of a specific structural form” (Oswald 1985: 162) such as a Stone-Geary 
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utility function (Dertouzos and Pencavel 1981) or an addilog objective function 
(Pencavel 1984).  
 The tradition of Dunlop’s maximizing union continued in one of the early 
basic models of unions’ behaviour,  the “Monopoly Union Model” (Fellner 1949; 
Cartter 1959). In this model, the union is assumed to set wages unilaterally and then 
the firm freely determines employment according to its downward sloping labour 
demand curve. The monopoly model predicts that the organization of workers into 
trade unions gives them the market power to raise the wage above the nonunion level. 
The original monopoly union model relied upon the hypotheses of identical 
individuals with homogenous preferences and a fixed membership level. Hence, some 
authors attempted to extend the model by assuming either heterogeneous preferences 
in the objective function (Farber 1978) or permitting union membership to be 
endogenous by developing dynamic formulations of the monopoly model (Booth 
1984; Kidd and Oswald 1987). More precisely, Farber constructed a model of union 
behavior based on maximization of the expected utility of the median-aged union 
member who “is assumed to have a utility function which depends on the level of 
compensation he receives” (1978: 925). On the other hand, Booth (1984) developed a 
“median voter” model (see below) with endogenous union membership conceiving 
trade unions as (political) organizations which include heterogeneous individuals. 
Furthermore, she held that the model should explicitly take into consideration the 
influence of union wage policies on the membership level. In a similar vein, Kidd and 
Oswald (1987) argued that “the trade union is assumed to solve an intertemporal 
maximization problem in which it bears in mind that the way to have higher 
membership tomorrow is to have higher employment today. If the union has 
utilitarian preferences, the steady-state level of employment lies above that in the 
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usual static model. In this sense, conventional models overstate the distortionary 
effects of trade unions” (1987: 363).   
Furthermore, the monopoly union model is closely related to the so-called 
“right to manage model”, according to which the union and the firm bargain about the 
wage rate, and the firm then fixes employment unilaterally taking wages as given 
(Nickell & Andrews 1983). It is obvious that the monopoly model is a special case of 
the “right to manage” one, where the firm’s bargaining power is equal to zero. The 
latter approach seems to be closer to reality, since wages are usually determined 
through collective bargaining and agreement and not merely set by trade unions 
(Oswald 1985). Moreover, the “right to manage” model also differs from models 
where unions and firms bargain over both employment and wages to the same degree. 
According to  Nickell & Andrews (1983: 184), the latter framework is “unappealing a 
priori on the basis of the observation that firms are continuously adjusting the size of 
their labour force without any intensive bargaining with unions except in the rare 
cases where the adjustment involves compulsory redundancy”. 
Another popular model in the analysis of union behaviour is the “median 
voter” model which is closely linked to social choice theory and public finance 
literature (Black 1948; Arrow 1950). This model relied upon the assumption that the 
leadership is democratically elected by the voting population. Thus, the union leader 
will try to maximize the utility of the median voter in order to be re-elected (Booth 
1995). This model “is a very powerful tool for aggregating the preferences of union 
members into a coherent objective function for the union as a whole. However, its 
applicability is limited due to the restrictive set of assumptions required” (Farber 
1986: 1078). The most fundamental assumption is that the union is conceived as a 
perfectly democratic organization, “in the sense that the leadership would be defeated 
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immediately and costlessly if they strayed at all from the voting equilibrium wage” 
(Ibid). 
On the other hand, some other models put emphasis on the differences 
between unions’ members and their leaders following Ross’ approach. For instance, 
Berkowitz (1954) and Atherton (1973), like Ross, recognized the significance of 
imperfections in the democratic process of unions and the accompanying differences 
in the goals between the leadership and the rank and file. Moreover, Farber (1986) 
tried to examine the constraints that the union leadership faces. “The primary 
constraint on the union leadership is that they remain in power because otherwise they 
would not be able to pursue their objectives, whatever they might be (…) Essentially, 
limits will be set on how far the leadership can deviate from the interests of the 
membership, perhaps as reflected in a voting equilibrium. These limits will depend 
crucially on the friction in the democratic process” (1986: 1080). In addition, 
Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), by seeking to provide a more “realistic” approach to 
the problem, developed a model in which they assumed that there are not two but 
three parties involved in labor-management negotiations, viz. the management, the 
union leaders, and the union members. Accordingly, they explicitly assumed that the 
union leadership and the union rank and file do not have similar goals and 
expectations. Finally, Faith and Reid (1983) reformulated the problem by using 
principal-agent theory. In this case, the union leadership acts as a collective agent for 
the individual members. “An agent (…) can promote efficiency first by helping solve 
public goods and asymmetric information problems in the workplace or by achieving 
economies of scale in coordination and communication and second by facilitating a 
monopolization of the labor supply and thereby capturing rents for workers. [Faith 
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and Reid] conclude that both reasons are plausible but that the monopoly effect 
typically dominates” (Kaufman 2002: 128; brackets added). 
 Finally, there are the bargaining models including the efficient contract 
(bargain) model (Leontief 1946; McDonald and Solow 1981), and other more recent  
bargaining models which have employed the  game-theoretic framework of the  1980s 
(e.g. Booth 1995; Manzini 1998). These approaches tried to fix the monopoly model 
inefficient (not Pareto optimal) outcome, by assuming a process of negotiation 
between unions and firms with respect to both employment and wages. Thus, the 
efficient bargaining model assumes that firms and unions jointly bargain on wages 
and employment. Employment is then determined efficiently, since the marginal 
product of labour is equal to the labourers’ opportunity cost. Furthermore, two types 
of modelling bargaining behaviour have widely been used. The first is the “axiomatic 
Nash approach”, which supposes that bargaining is a cooperative game and that the 
outcome must satisfy specific fundamental principles or axioms stated probably as 
requirements by an unbiased and fair arbitrator called in to resolve the dispute 
between the two parties (Kaufman 2002). The second approach relates to game-
theoretic noncooperative models of bargaining formulated in the early 1980s 
(Rubinstein 1982; Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986; Binmore and Dasgupta 
1987). These models sought to establish more sophisticated behavioral foundations in 
order  to remedy the “neglect of the bargaining process (as opposed to the outcome), 
and [to strengthen] (…) the ability to generate testable hypotheses (…). The 
advantage of this approach is that it explicitly models the objective functions of the 
bargainers, specifies the resources of the bargainers and the rule structuring the 
negotiations, and permits inclusion of common negotiating tactics, such as bluffing 
and recourse to strikes” (Kaufman 2002: 132).  
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  VI. Criticisms of the Current Theory and  Signs of Re-Evaluation of  Ross’ 
Ideas  
As was mentioned above, the post war developments in the union objectives 
literature is characterized by the dominance of the Dunlop’s line of thought with the 
gradual marginalization of Ross type approaches. Most of  the above mentioned 
formulations which are broadly based on Ross’ conception,  are also characterized by 
the extensive use of formalism. More specifically, the application of constraint 
optimization method developed in tandem with the first appearances  of specific union 
utility functions (wage bill and rent maximization). The mathematical framework of 
game theory also dominated the more recent formulations of  union bargaining 
theories. The conceptual framework of formalism also includes the econometric 
techniques employed to test the various predictions of the models. This 
methodological trend is closely connected to model union theory along the lines of the 
standard neoclassical theory of the firm (Kaufman 2002).  
 However, in the last two decades, an increasing number of specialists have 
started to  express  serious concerns and doubts for the current state of the theory. 
More specifically, commencing in the 1980’s, some influential labor economists 
started casting doubt to the fruitfulness of the standard approach. In an early book, 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) maintained that labour economics had produced little 
quantitative evidence concerning the effects of unionism other than wages. In a 
similar tone, Ulph and Ulph (1990) examining two of the most widely used union 
models, the right-to-manage and  the efficient bargain models, admit that  neither of 
them  conform to the available data. The criticism continued in the 1990’s  when 
some prominent labor economists expressed reservations regarding the theoretical 
usefulness  of the dominant approach. For instance, in an 1994 article examining the 
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robustness of the trade union economic theory, A. Manning  argued that the 
foundations of the economic theory of the trade union are very fragile (1994). Denny 
and Nickell (1992) also acknowledged the fragility of the standard theory when they 
concluded that  the predictions based on union models, rely heavily on the 
assumptions which underline them.  Similarly, Pencavel expressed serious doubts 
regarding the theoretical progress in the understanding of the wage, hour and 
employment aspects of unionism (1991: 160). Pencavel argued that the standard 
modelling of union behaviour is the main cause of this state of affairs. Furthermore,  
Addison and Chilton,  in  their review (1997: 187) of trade union literature, 
emphasized again the fragility of union models and the disappointing theoretical 
results of the standard approach (see also Fleetwood 1999; Boyer and Smith 2001). 
In general, there are many signs that the dominant post war trend of 
developing the Dunlop approach combined with increasing formalism, has started to 
be questioned by influential figures in labor economics. This seems to be linked to the 
gradual realization of the serious shortcomings of Dunlop’s “pure microeconomic” 
framework and thus to the re-examination of   Ross’  views on unionism. This has led 
to the  re-appreciation of  the political and institutional aspects of unions behaviour 
and in general of their multi-dimensional character. For instance, the Rossian 
conception implies that unions, among other concerns,  pay attention to protecting 
relative income positions, and  maintaining fairness or equity norms. This means that 
contrary to the mainstream economic theory  preoccupation with independent 
preferences, union preferences might be  interdependent (Kaufman 1999; 
Drakopoulos 2011). One manifestation of  interdependent union preferences is wage 
imitation or wage interdependence. A number of authors have realized the potential of 
this idea for enriching union theory  in the sense that they might offer additional 
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explanations for higher than optimal wages, wage rigidity and inflationary bias 
(Pencavel 1991; De la Croix 1994).  Furthermore, the idea of fairness as a union 
concern,  has also been explored by some theorists with interesting insights. In an 
early book, R. Solow argued that the idea of fairness in labor markets undermines the 
standard textbook treatment (Solow 1990: 9-10). Since then there have been attempts 
to investigate  the role of fairness in union decisions  (see for instance, Rees 1993;  
Clark and Oswald 1998; Skott 2005). In the same tone, there have been attempts to 
take into consideration the political dimension of unions, which again was one 
important aspect of Rossian approach. This has led a number of  labor economists to 
introduce concepts and ideas taken from public economics, public choice, political 
theory and also from the new institutional economics. The median voter model, the 
view of unions as bureaucracies or governance structures are examples of this trend 
(see for instance, Inman 1987; Pemberton 1988; Furubotn and Richter 1997; Kaufman 
and Levine 2000).  
Finally, there is a further indication of a revival of Rossian approaches in the 
growing interest concerning the nature and role of unions in contemporary  behavioral  
economics. The multi-dimensional character of the trade unions, combined with ideas 
such as the heterogeneity of  workers, the influence of  cultural trends, social forces 
and  collective emotions on unions, are present in these discussions (see for instance, 
Berg 2006).  
All of the above imply that the orthodox “microeconomic” approach to union 
behaviour which prevailed in the post war decades, has started to be seriously 
questioned. Important reasons  for this, were  its theoretical fragility, poor predictive 
results and its weakness in explaining many aspects of unionism. They also indicate 
the gradual realization for the need for  looking more carefully at the Rossian 
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approach which necessary implies a re-examination of the standard  methodology of 
union analysis and also of the benefits of an  interdisciplinary viewpoint. The more 
recent developments in the literature, seem to confirm this conceptual turn in the 
study of unionism.  
 
VII. Concluding Comments 
The paper discussed the historical development of the economic analysis of  
trade unions from a methodological perspective. As was observed, the pre-war 
approaches to trade unions were mainly based on the theoretical and methodological 
viewpoints of early heterodox and institutional economists. Thus, trade unions were 
conceived of as politico-economic organizations whose members were motivated by 
relative comparisons and also were concerned with issues of equity and justice. In the 
post-war period, there was a major theoretical and methodological shift towards the 
idea of unions as optimizing economic units with well-defined objective functions 
which are optimized subject to purely economic constraints. This conceptual 
transformation took place mainly through the Dunlop-Ross debate. In particular, John 
Dunlop conceived unions as analogous to business firms, and developed a formal 
analytical model of trade union behaviour based on the microeconomic theory of the 
firm. This was contrary to Arthur Ross’ institutional and political approach. The 
emerging post war mainstream methodological framework with its mathematical 
formalism and the exclusion of sociological, political and psychological elements 
from economic analysis was the main reason for the prevalence of Dunlop’s ideas. 
 However, after decades of analytical developments, the current state of trade 
union theory and also of trade union objectives has not produced very impressive 
theoretical results. In particular,  many influential labour economists have expressed 
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doubts concerning the theoretical fragility, poor predictive results and the weakness in 
explaining many aspects of unionism of the standard theory. In addition,  there are 
increasing signs of re-evaluation of Ross’ line of thought in the relevant literature, as 
a possible way to tackle the above problems. More specifically, the Rossian approach 
means more emphasis on the political and institutional aspects of union behaviour  
including concern for protecting relative income positions, and  maintaining fairness 
or equity norms.  
Thus, the examination of the development of the trade union literature 
indicates the problematic character of the dominant methodological position of 
mainstream economic theory as applied to the study of unions. It seems that this area 
of economics research can be seen as a good example of the shortcomings of the 
uniform application of orthodox methodology to every aspect of economic discourse.  
 
 
 23 
References 
 
Addison, J.  and Chilton, J.  1997. “Models of Union Behavior.” In David Lewin, 
Daniel Mitchell, and Mahmood Zaidi (eds.), The Human Resource Management 
Handbook, Part II, pp. 157–96. 
Ashenfelter, O. C. & Johnson, G. E. 1969. “Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and 
Industrial Strike Activity.” American Economic Review 59: 35-49. 
Arrow, K. J. 1950. “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare.” The Journal of 
Political Economy 58 (4) (August): 328-346. 
Atherton, W. 1973. Theory of Union Bargaining Goals. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Backhouse, R. 1994. “The Lakatosian Legacy in Economic Methodology”, in R. 
Backhouse (ed) New Directions in Economic Methodology, London: Routledge, 173-
191. 
Berg, N. 2006. “Behavioral Labor Economics” in  Altman, M (ed) Handbook of 
Contemporary Behavioral Economics, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 457-478. 
Berkowitz, M. 1954. “The Economics of Trade Union Organization and 
Administration.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 7 (4): 575–92. 
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. 1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution 
in Economic Modelling.” Rand Journal of Economics 17: 176–188. 
_____ and P. Dasgupta. 1987. The Economics of Bargaining. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Black, D. 1948. “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making.” Journal of Political 
Economy 56: 23–34 
Blaug, M. 1980. The Methodology of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Booth, A. 1984. “A Public Choice Model of Trade Union Behavior and Membership.” 
Economic Journal 94 (December): 883–98. 
_____. 1985. “The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union 
Membership.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100(February): 253–61. 
_____. 1995. The Economics of the Trade Union. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Borland, J. 1986. “The Ross-Dunlop Debate Revisited.” Journal of Labor Research 7 
(Summer): 293–308. 
 24 
Boyer, G. and Smith, R. 2001. “The Development of the Neoclassical Tradition in 
Labor Economics.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54, (2): 199-223. 
Bruni, L. and Sugden, R.  2007. “The road not taken: how psychology was removed 
from economics, and how it might be brought back.” The Economic Journal 117: 
146-173. 
Caldwell, B. 1982. Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth 
Century, London: Allen and Unwin. 
Calvo, G. 1978. “Urban unemployment and wage determination in LDCs: Trade 
unions in the Harris-Todaro model.” International Economic Review 19: 65-81. 
Cartter, A. 1959. Theory of Wages and Employment. Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Clark, A. and Oswald, A. 1998. “Comparison-Concave Utility and Following Behaviour 
in Social and Economic Settings.” Journal of Public Economics 70:133-55. 
De la Croix, D. 1994. “Wage Interdependence Through Decentralized Bargaining.” 
Journal of Economic Surveys 8(4): 371–403. 
De Menil, G. 1971. Bargaining: Monopoly Power versus Union Power. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Denny, K. and Nickell, J. 1992. “Unions and investment in British Industry.” 
Economic Journal 102: 847-887 
Dertouzos, J., and J. Pencavel. 1981. “Wage and Employment Determination under 
Trade Unionism: The International Typographical Union.” Journal of Political 
Economy 89(6): 1162-81. 
Dow, S. 2002. Economic Methodology: An Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Drakopoulos, S. 1994. “Some Implications of the New Physics for Economic 
Methodology.” South African Journal of Economics 62 (4): 198-209. 
_____. 2011. “The Neglect of Comparison Income: an Historical Perspective.” 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 18 (3): 441-464. 
Dunlop, J. 1944. Wage Determination Under Trade Unions. New York: Macmillan. 
Edgeworth, F. Y. 1881. Mathematical Psychics. London: E. Kegan Paul. 
Ely, R. T. 1890. “A Programme for Labor Reform.” The Century; a popular quarterly 
39(6) (April): 938-952. 
Faith, R. and J. Reid. 1983. “The Labor Union as Its Members’ Agent.” In Joseph 
Reid (ed.), New Approaches to Labor Unions, Suppl. 2, pp. 3–25 of Ronald 
Ehrenberg (ed.), Research in Labor Economics. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 25 
Farber, H. 1978. “Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case 
of the United Mine Workers.” Journal of Political Economy 68 (October): 923–42. 
_____. 1986. “The Analysis of Union Behavior.” In Orley Ashenfelter and Richard 
Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 2, pp. 1039–89. New York: 
North-Holland. 
Fellner, W. 1949. Competition Among the Few. New York: Knopf. 
Fleetwood, S. 1999. “The Inadequacy of Mainstream Theories of Trade Union 
Behavior.” Labour 13(2): 445–80. 
Freeman, R. and Medoff, J.  1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books 
Friedman, M. 1953. “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, in Essays in Positive 
Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Furubotn, E. and Richter, R. 1997. Institutions and Economic Theory, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Hicks, J. 1932. The Theory of Wages. New York: Macmillan. 
Hieser, R. 1970: “Wage determination with bilateral monopoly in the labour market: 
A theoretical treatment.” Economic Record 31: 55-72. 
Howson, S. 2004. “The Origins of Lionel Robbins’s Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science.” History of Political Economy 36: 413-443. 
Hutchison, T. 1938. The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory. 
London: Macmillan. 
Inman, R. 1987. “Markets, Governments, and the ‘New’ Political Economy”, in Alan 
Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, pp. 647–777. 
New York: North Holland. 
Jevons, S. W. 1882. The State in Relation to Labour. London: Macmillan  
Johnston, J. 1972. “A Model of Wage Determination under Bilateral Monopoly.” 
Economic Journal 82: 837-852.  
Kaufman, B. E. 1999. “Expanding the Behavioral Foundations of Labor Economics”, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52(3): 361-92. 
_____. 2000. “The Early Institutionalists on Industrial Democracy and Union 
Democracy.” Journal of Labor Research 21 (2) (Spring): 189-209. 
_____. 2002. “Models of Union Wage Determination: What Have We Learned Since 
Dunlop and Ross?” Industrial Relations 41 (1) (January): 110-158. 
 26 
_____   and Levine, D. 2000. “An Economic Analysis of Employee Representation.” 
In Bruce Kaufman and Daphne Taras (eds.), Nonunion Employee Representation: 
History, Contemporary Practice and Policy. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
 
Kidd, D. and A. Oswald. 1987. “A Dynamic Model of Trade Union Behavior.” 
Economica 54 (August): 355–588. 
Leontieff, W. 1946. “The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed Annual Wage Contract.” 
Journal of Political Economy 54 (February): 76–9. 
Manning, A. 1994. “How Robust Is the Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union?” 
Journal of Labor Economics 12 (July):430–59. 
Manzini, P. 1998. “Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining.” Journal of 
Economic Surveys 12(February): 1–41. 
McDonald, I. and R. Solow. 1981. “Wage Bargaining and Employment.” American 
Economic Review 71(December): 896–908. 
McNulty, P. J. 1980. The Origins and Development of Labor Economics: A Chapter 
in the History of Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Mirowski, P. 1989. More Heat than Light, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mitchell, D. 1972. “Union Wage Policies: The Ross-Dunlop Debate Reopened.” 
Industrial Relations 11 (Winter): 46–61. 
Nickell, S. and M. Andrews. 1983. “Unions, Real Wages and Employment in Britain 
1951–79.” Oxford Economic Papers 35 (November, Suppl.): 183–206. 
Oswald, A. 1982. “The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union.” Economic 
Journal 92(September): 576–95. 
_____. 1985. “The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87: 167–93. 
Pemberton, J. 1988. “A Managerial Model of the Trade Union.” Economic Journal 98 
(September):755–71. 
Pencavel, J. 1984. “The Trade-Off Between Wages and Employment in Trade Union 
Objectives.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 99(2): 215–31. 
_____. 1991. Labor Markets and Trade Unionism. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Perlman, M. 1960. “Labor Movement Theories: Past, Present, and Future.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 13 (April): 338-348. 
Redman, D. 1993. Economics and the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 27 
Rees, A. 1976. “H. Gregg Lewis and the Development of Analytical Labor 
Economics”. The Journal of Political Economy 84 (4) Part 2: Essays in Labor 
Economics in Honor of H. Gregg Lewis. (August): S3-S8. 
_____. 1993. “The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 11(January, part 1):243–52. 
Robbins, L. 1932. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
London: Macmillan. 
Rosen, S. 1969. “Trade union power, threat effects, and the extent of organization.” 
Review of Economic Studies 36: 185-196. 
Ross, A. 1947. “The Trade Union as a Wage-fixing Institution”. The American 
Economic Review 37(4) (September): 566-588 
_____. 1948. Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 
50(1): 97–109. 
Seligman, B. 1969. “The Impact of Positivism on Economic Thought”, History of 
Political Economy 1: 256-78. 
Skott, P. 2005. “Fairness as a Source of Hysterisis in Employment of Relative Wages.” 
Journal of Economic and Behavioral Organization, 57: 305-31. 
Solow, R. 1990. The Labor Market as a Social Institution, New York: Blackwell. 
Ulph, A. and Ulph, D. 1990. “Union Bargaining: a Survey of Recent Work” in 
Sapsford, D. and Tzannatos, Z. (eds) Current Issues in Labor Economics, London: 
Macmillan. 
Webb, S. and B. Webb 1897. Industrial Democracy. London: Longmans, Green. 
Wisman, J. 1978. “The Naturalist Turn of Orthodox Economics: A Study of 
Methodological Misunderstanding.” Review of Social Economy 36:  263–284. 
Zeuthen, F. 1930. Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
